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Organizations matter: they are
institutions, after all
JOHN LINARELLI∗
University of La Verne College of Law, Ontario California, United States

Abstract: Judge Posner (2010) offers a substantial agenda for organization
economics. He advises us on how organization economics can shed substantial
light on some of the most pressing social problems of the day. I comment on two
of the areas he selects for discussion and offer some comments on the relationship
of organization economics to new institutional economics. Judge Posner surely is
right to argue that organization economics can help us understand the failures of
corporate governance in regulating executive pay. Moreover, with additional and
more institutionally nuanced theorizing, organizational economics should further
our understanding of the work of judiciaries in the civilian and common law
traditions. Judge Posner tells us that organization economics and new institutional
economics are related fields. I make a plea for economic holism. Organizations are
institutions. While getting clear on disciplinary boundaries and the differing kinds
and concepts of institutions is important, logical differences in concepts like
‘organization’ and ‘institution’ may be less important than what to emphasize in
theory construction and what to test for with those theories. The success of
organization economics will be in whether the different emphases produce new
insights. Judge Posner is right to tell us that new insights are coming and will
continue to come from organization economics. This is true however we
conceptualize the field as a school of thought.

‘We are all legal realists now’ is a common saying in the American legal academy,
used to refer to the idea that the American legal realists changed the way we
inquire about law, going beyond the formal, and to include the social, the
political, and the historical. Intellectual leaders of the generation succeeding
the legal realists, Judge Posner one of the most influential among them, brought
about a second revolution in the legal academy, one with economic analysis at
its core. Judge Posner’s work has been instrumental in changing the way we
think about the law. His canonical text, Economic Analysis of Law, now in
its seventh edition, is probably one of the most important books on law in the
English language in the twentieth century (Posner, 2007). Economic analysis has
profoundly influenced the structure of legal thought, at least in the United States.
∗ Email: jlinarelli@laverne.edu.
I am grateful for helpful comments from James Hackney. All errors are mine.
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One can find that influence in many casebooks in American law schools. Judge
Posner’s more recent writings advance us to a pragmatic way of understanding
law, but still informed by economics (Hackney, 2007; Posner, 1999, 2001).
In his article for this journal, Judge Posner (2010) continues his pragmatic
enterprise by informing us that organization economics has the potential to
further our understanding of organizations of relevance to law and that focusing
organization economics on law-related organizations will blend organizational
economics into economic analysis of law. He also identifies connections between
organization economics and new institutional economics, or between ‘OE’ and
‘NIE’, as they are sometimes referred to in this essay. In sum, and to adapt a
phrase originating in NIE, Judge Posner tells us that ‘organizations matter’.
I make three sets of points, two substantive and one methodological. Starting
with the substantive points, Judge Posner makes an important contribution to the
discussion of excess corporate compensation. More research along the lines he
suggests, and more importantly, a following up with legal reform along the lines
suggested by that research, is one of the more important corporate governance
projects we face in the coming years. Second, organization economics might
be able to assist in comparative examinations of common law and civilian
judiciaries, but I believe that additional theory construction is necessary in
that area. The work on judiciaries leads to my methodological points, which
summarize into a worry about too much compartmentalization in economics
and skepticism about whether NIE and OE sharply demarcate.
1. Excess executive compensation
Judge Posner describes a dismal state of affairs for corporate governance, at
least in the United States and in other countries with capital markets in which
share ownership is dispersed. Shareholders often have few incentives to monitor
because of free rider problems. If they are dissatisfied with the firm’s performance,
they can sell their shares rather than engage in costly monitoring. Product and
capital markets are overrated as controls on agency costs. Various commitment
devices for monitoring and keeping managers accountable in the nonprofit sector
are not feasible in for-profit firms. CEO performance is difficult to evaluate. Dispersed share ownership means that directors have poor incentives to monitor on
behalf of shareholders. Directors are often highly paid executives themselves and
tend to accept the notion that significant compensation packages for CEOs and
other senior management are warranted. Outside directors are part-timers and
devote too little time to the firm, while inside directors have a structural or positional conflict of interest. The CEO has significant influence over selection of both
insider and outside board members, hires and pays auditors, and steers underwriting fees to securities analysts. Boards are captured by the so-called IBM effect;
they believe that paying top dollar for the top dog means they are getting top quality. Consulting firms hired by the compensation committees of boards of directors
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confirm these beliefs. CEO candidates, knowing the game, demand significant
compensation as a signal of their quality. The board’s selection of a CEO is the
acceptance of the CEO’s business strategy; when the board and the CEO disagree
on strategic issues, it is a signal that a new CEO may be required. Boards fail to tie
stock compensation to performance. The practice until recently of not expensing
compensation in the form of stock options supports doubts about the efficiency
of capital markets. Stock option compensation gives managers incentives to take
too much risk because their loss downside is capped at the value of the stock
options but their upside is unbounded. Boards of directors approve a number of
questionable compensation packages, such as golden parachutes, on the basis of
questionable rationales. And so on.
These pathologies of corporate governance that Judge Posner identifies may
not direct us inexorably towards OE theories or techniques for understanding
them, but they do tell us that when share ownership is dispersed, and monitoring
by shareholders is costly, the board of directors as an organization needs to be
radically rethought and restructured. Others have used economic analysis to
reach similar results. But Judge Posner directs our attention more directly to
facts about organizations that matter.
Here is a way to understand OE’s connection to standard versions of economic
analysis of corporate law. Fiduciary duties are of doubtful effectiveness for
monitoring directors, but their enforcement by courts could be seen as one of
several monitoring devices. These legal standards, if effectively enforced, should
affect the composition and action of the board as an organization. If what Judge
Posner says is true, boards of directors in the United States and elsewhere are
currently governed by legal standards that are wholly inadequate to the task of
maximizing shareholder wealth or the interests of any constituency other than
management. US and British courts generally presume that board decisions are
entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule, which is that the
directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and with the honest belief
that the decision was taken in the company’s best interests. Courts will not
second-guess board decisions but look primarily at the adequacy of the decisionmaking process. Courts will review the merits of board decisions under duty of
loyalty standards when board members have a conflict of interest, but conflicts
of interest are defined very narrowly to be conflicts between corporate interests
and the financial or private interests of board members, such as when directors
are on both sides of a transaction − a set of circumstances that are very rare for
publicly held companies. Structural conflicts do not count, except possibly as in
the narrow exception Delaware has carved out for special litigation committees
in demand excused cases in derivative action litigation.1 So, in the US and likely
1 In Re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). It is arguable that structural
conflicts do matter to some extent in judicial review of takeover defenses in US courts, but that subject is
beyond our scope here. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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elsewhere, the structural conflicts of interest Judge Posner identifies have no
legal significance. Fiduciary duties provide weak incentives for a board to act in
the interests of shareholders. Connect these defects in substantive law with the
costliness of shareholder derivative litigation, along with the failure of capital and
product markets to discipline the market for managers, and we get the familiar
results. It is an interesting result to say that OE might tell us to substantially
strengthen fiduciary duties so as to more closely align director and shareholder
interests, because it also means that the move to making fiduciary duties default
rules, suggested by some neoclassical law and economics scholars, is precisely the
wrong argument to make (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Bainbridge, 2008).
Judge Posner is in the forefront of controversies in the courts about the scope
of fiduciary duties. In Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., mutual fund investors sued
an investment adviser for breach of fiduciary duty in charging allegedly excessive
fees to manage the funds.2 The US Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended
in 1970, imposes fiduciary duties on investment advisers relating to compensation
for their services.3 In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that an investment adviser violates the fiduciary
duty if her fee ‘bears no relationship to the services rendered and could not
have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining’.4 Gartenberg holds that
judges can determine whether investment advisor fees are excessive. In Jones,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Frank
Easterbrook, explicitly disapproved of Gartenberg and held that fiduciary duties
require full disclosure and that investment advisors ‘play no tricks’ but that
a judicial evaluation of fees goes too far because efficient capital markets and
competition in the investment industry effectively regulate fees.5 Judge Posner
did not sit on the panel for the case but wrote the dissent in the denial of a motion
for a rehearing en banc. In his dissent, he criticized Judge Easterbrook’s majority
opinion as based on ‘an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the
basis of the growing indications that executive compensation in large publicly
traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of
directors to police compensation’.6 He further explained that ‘competition in the
product and capital markets can’t be counted on to solve the problem because
the same structure of incentives operates on all large corporations and similar
entities, including mutual funds. Mutual funds are a component of the financial
services industry, where abuses have been rampant.’7 The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in the case.

2 Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008).
3 15 U.S.C. §80a-35b.
4 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).
5 Jones, 527 F.3d at 632.
6 Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P., 537 F.2d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008).
7 Ibid.
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Judge Posner’s account has special relevance in these times of economic crisis.
The AIG bonus controversy, though exaggerated in significance by the media, is
a recent example of the failure of corporate governance. AIG could not survive
without billions of dollars of bailout funds from the US federal government.
Regardless of whether AIG management bears any responsibility for the failure
of the company or the financial crisis, it is a firm in severe financial distress and
in no position to pay out over $1 billion in bonuses. Yet the AIG CEO testified
before the US Congress that the law obligates AIG to ‘honor its contracts’ and
the Obama Administration ended up agreeing with this assessment. If indeed
it is not a breach of fiduciary duty for a board to approve contracts that pay
guaranteed compensation regardless of the financial status of the firm, then
the law fails to provide boards with the proper incentives. It is common for
other types of contracts, such as loans and employment contracts for mid-level
employees, to contain conditions excusing performance in the event of financial
exigency. AIG managers have more protection than university professors, whose
tenure is subject to financial exigency conditions and who forego high levels of
compensation for job security, autonomy, and reputational rewards.
The existing economic toolkit might help us to understand these problems and
to devise prescriptions. OE’s merits are perhaps in its focus on the board as an
organization and that focus may shed new light on corporate law’s failures
to provide incentives for corporations to develop organizational structures
responsive to shareholder interests. Judge Posner says that OE and economic
analysis of law may blend together. The above discussion is at least a partial
attempt to show how the two specializations connect. Fiduciary duties tell us
a great deal about how boards of directors function as organizations. If, for
example, courts were to expand fiduciary duties to regulate structural conflicts
of interest and effectively enforced such duties in shareholder litigation that
actually benefits shareholders, we might see very different board compositions
and decisions. But OE might likely confirm for us that courts and fiduciary
duties can be ineffective in aligning shareholder and management interests and
that ex ante regulation might be necessary. Here we can turn the question around
and ask which organization, or mix of organizations, are better regulators, the
Delaware judiciary and legislature, Congress and the SEC, or a mix of some or
all?
2. Comparing common law and civilian judiciaries
Judge Posner’s insight that OE has a role in understanding differences in career
judiciaries in civilian legal systems versus status judiciaries in common law
systems has the potential to open the scope of inquiry in the growing field
of the economics of comparative law or comparative law and economics. NIE
has made inroads in that field (Mattei, 1997). Judge Posner advises that it is now
time for OE to have a role.
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The distinction between career and status judiciaries is a significant one with
deep historical roots. Stripped of its historical narrative and recast as a principalagent problem, the question is one of control of the judiciary, the agent, by the
legislature, the principal, with the ultimate principal being the citizens. Judge
Posner says that civilian judiciaries function like any other public bureaucracy
and that ‘an essential control mechanism in public bureaucracies . . . is clear rules
to guide employees’. He further states that in civilian legal systems, ‘detailed
legal codes reduce judicial discretion by enabling and directing the judges to
decide the vast majority of cases by a simple comparison of the text of the
applicable code with the facts of the case’, that ‘career judiciaries tend to be
found in legal systems that rely heavily on detailed codes rather than on looser
standards that are characteristic of common law systems’, and that the decision
to have a career judiciary may lead to the adoption of detailed codes. He also
says that ‘America’s undisciplined legislatures can rarely produce legal codes that
are sufficiently clear and detailed to minimize judicial discretion’, which makes
status judiciaries better in a common law jurisdictions like the United States.
It is doubtful that the codes found in civil law systems are doing the work
of controlling the judiciary as Judge Posner suggests, but he is right to argue
that OE has something to offer in the analysis of judiciaries. Civilian codes are
far from detailed. For example, French courts have interpreted Articles 1381
through 1384 of the French Civil Code to form the basis of the French law of
obligations in what we would know as tort law in the common law tradition
(Gordley, 2006; Merryman and Perez-Perdoma, 2007). These provisions are
vague or empty to American lawyers, in the form of what we would know as
general principles or precepts. They use words such as ‘harm’ and ‘fault’, but do
not define them, leaving French courts to decide their meaning. French courts
have declared Article 1384 to be the source for strict liability, even though the
relevant language of that article, written in the early nineteenth century, says
nothing about strict liability without some serious interpretive work.
What infuses these provisions with meaning and acceptable levels of certainty
is not the level of detail in their language. Rather, in OE terms, it is the
professional culture in the civilian legal system that likely provides the controls
Judge Posner seeks to explain. Code provisions seem empty to American
lawyers because we do not participate in the ‘code’ of the civilian professional
culture. The civilian system of legal education inculcates legal professionals
into the ‘science’ of law, built in a cathedral-like manner from the ground
up in code and in the commentaries written by academics. Civilian lawyers
and judges use the codes, the commentaries, and other materials to acquire
an understanding of doctrine. The codes in this system are supposed to be
complete, systematic, and rational statements of the law and judges are supposed
to apply but not interpret their provisions, or at least not use grammatical
methods of interpretation. Whether this professional culture actually controls
career judiciaries is debatable. While the ‘image’ of the civilian judge is that of
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the automaton who mechanistically uses the syllogism to decide cases, that is
widely understood to be a mischaracterization (MacLean, 1982).
So far all that has been said is not yet at the level of testable theory. But there
are plenty of facts about organizations from which to start the work of theory
construction. Whether an OE focus results in new insights remains to be seen.
3. A plea for economic holism
The distinction between NIE and OE may beg a question. Are there real
differences between them, or are they both simply part of a more broadly
conceptualized tradition in institutionally informed economics? What is the
difference between an organization and an institution? Going back to the very
first article published in the Journal of Institutional Economics, we find John
Searle’s description of an institution as a social practice assigning a status to a
person or thing to do something it could not do solely by virtue of its physical
structure (Searle, 2005). His description includes organizations. Douglass
North’s definition of an institution could be said to include organizations
(Hodgson, 2006). Geoffrey Hodgson makes clear distinctions but defines an
organization to be a special sort of institution. He defines ‘institutions’ as ‘systems
of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions’ and
‘organizations’ as ‘special institutions that involve (a) criteria to establish their
boundaries and to distinguish their members from nonmembers, (b) principles of
sovereignty concerning who is in charge, and (c) chains of command delineating
responsibilities within the organization’ (Hodgson, 2006). The internal aspects
of many organizations seem to depend at least partly for their existence and
structure on institutions. For example, the composition of the corporate board
of directors depends on legal rules, stock exchange listing standards, and social
norms. Similar points can be made about national security agencies such as
Homeland Security, the CIA, and the FBI, and judiciaries in both civilian and
common law jurisdictions.
Contemporary economics thrives on compartmentalization into schools of
thought. Do these schools of thought matter in the search for truth? Theory
construction might be more a matter of emphasis than of strict demarcations
based on logical differences in concepts like ‘organization’ and ‘institution’. The
question of emphasis in theory construction may make a difference in shedding
new light on old problems. OE might be said to focus on the internal aspects of
organizations, while NIE on socio-economic aspects (Hodgson, 2006). In sum,
organizations matter; they are institutions after all.
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